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U.S. copyright law is grounded in a utilitarian philosophy: authors are granted a 
limited monopoly to incentivize production of original expressive works for the benefit 
of society as a whole. This philosophy may need to be applied to non-human, machine 
authors in the very near future. Works of literature, music, and art are increasingly 
being generated through the execution of software programs, suggesting that these 
machine-authored works may become the norm rather than the exception. The 
burgeoning of computer-generated works raises novel and fascinating questions of 
copyrightability, but the existing literature neglects to address a basic question: does 
extending copyright protection to machine-authored works promote or hinder the 
purpose of copyright law? 
This Comment makes several contributions to the scholarship on copyright law. 
First, it poses fundamental questions regarding how the existing copyright framework 
would be applied to the various players that contribute to machine-authored works 
and notes the problematic aspects of such application, particularly in identifying the 
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legal author of the work. Second, it evaluates whether—in the case of machine-authored 
works—the human author should be allocated rights based on the economic 
incentive theory. It argues that inflexible application of copyright law creates a 
contribution/rights paradox because the party that contributed most to the creation of 
the work—its author—is not the party to whom we would like to allocate copyright 
protection. Finally, the Comment posits that because copyrights provide little economic 
incentive to the players involved in creating machine-authored works, it would be 
inappropriate from a social policy standpoint to extend protection to fully independent 
computer-generated works. 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1246 
I. PURPOSE AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF COPYRIGHT LAW .... 1251 
II. MACHINE-AUTHORED WORKS ................................................ 1253 
A. Machine-Authored Works Defined ............................................... 1253 
B. Copyrightability of Machine-Authored Works ................................. 1255 
III. PROBLEMS OF APPLYING TRADITIONAL COPYRIGHT 
FRAMEWORK ........................................................................... 1257 
A. Authorship and Ownership ......................................................... 1257 
1. Machine as Author ............................................................ 1257 
2. Programmer as Author ...................................................... 1258 
3. End-User as Author .......................................................... 1259 
4. Joint Authorship ............................................................... 1259 
B. The Contribution/Rights Paradox ................................................ 1260 
C. Social Policy Arguments for Not Protecting Machine-Authored Works . 1263 
IV. PROTECTION PROPOSALS DESIGNED FOR  
 MACHINE-AUTHORED WORKS ............................................... 1265 
A. Immediate Entry into the Public Domain ...................................... 1265 
B. End-User: The Quasi-Property Treatment .................................... 1266 
C. Programmer Allocation: One-for-One Matching ............................ 1268 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 1269 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When a 2.7 magnitude earthquake hit Southern California on March 17, 
2014, the Los Angeles Times published a news report on the natural disaster 
within three minutes.1 How the L.A. Times managed to publish a report so 
quickly borders on science fiction. Moments after the quake, an algorithm 
 
1 Ken Schwencke, Earthquake Aftershock: 2.7 Quake Strikes Near Westwood, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 
17, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/17/news/earthquake-27-quake-strikes-near-westwood-
california-rdivor [https://perma.cc/3E9M-HB5B]. 
2017] The Machine Author 1247 
called Quakebot scraped data from the United States Geological Survey 
reports, plugged the information into a coded template, and generated the 
actual text of the article.2 By the time journalist and programmer Ken 
Schwencke had been woken by the quake and had walked to his computer, the 
text was already on the screen, ready for publication at the press of a button.3 
While the L.A. Times article was revised and updated over the course of 
the morning by actual human writers, all of their work built off the foundation 
Quakebot constructed. And Quakebot is not the only program of its kind. From 
reports on homicide4 to college sports statistics,5 software that automatically 
generates news stories is becoming increasingly prevalent in journalism. 
Quakebot’s article was not particularly sophisticated; it provided only the 
magnitude of the quake and its geographic location.6 But, however simple, 
banal, or nondescriptive they might be, machine-authored works like the 
article prepared by Quakebot are becoming indistinguishable from their 
human-authored counterparts.7 
As defined by this Comment, a “machine-authored work” is a fully 
independent computer-generated work. The “machine author” is a software 
program, like Quakebot, designed to generate literary content on command. 
The “work” is the byproduct of executing the software programming. 
Machine-authored works distinctly differ from what might historically be 
considered “machine-aided” works. A movie edited in the video-editing 
software Final Cut Pro, for example, would be a machine-aided work but not 
a machine-authored work. Although the machine computed and created the 
final product, it was only able to do so at the creative direction of its human 
operator. Thus, the most notable difference between a machine-authored work 
and a machine-aided work is that in the case of a machine-authored work, 
there is no distinct human author driving the creative process through 
composition, arrangement, selection, or direction. 
 
2 Will Oremus, The First News Report on the L.A. Earthquake Was Written by a Robot, SLATE 
(Mar. 17, 2014, 5:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/03/17/quakebot_los_angeles_
times_robot_journalist_writes_article_on_la_earthquake.html [https://perma.cc/28Q6-C336]. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Klint Finley, In the Future, Robots Will Write News That’s All About You, WIRED (Mar. 6, 2015, 
12:06 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/03/future-news-robots-writing-audiences-one [https://perma.
cc/JUH4-SYCK]. 
6 Oremus, supra note 2. 
7 See, e.g., Christer Clerwall, Enter the Robot Journalist, 8 JOURNALISM PRAC. 519 (2014) (finding, 
through an empirical study on software-generated content perception, that participants were not 
able to discern works generated by software from works written by a human author). 
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The burgeoning of machine-authored works raises novel and fascinating 
questions of copyrightability. Some questions are more intuitive than others.8 
For example, legal scholars going as far back as the 1980s have expounded on 
the foundational question of whether machine-authored works are legally 
entitled to copyright protection.9 Applying the basic inquiries of originality 
and authorship, many legal scholars have concluded that machine-authored 
works should be entitled to full copyright protection. 
Yet the existing literature neglects a far more fundamental question: does 
extending copyright protection to machine-authored works promote or hinder 
the purpose of copyright law? U.S. copyright law is grounded in a utilitarian 
philosophy: authors are granted a limited monopoly to incentivize production 
of original expressive works for the benefit of society as a whole.10 The rationale 
behind these measures has been intuitive and comprehensive—without such 
protection, authors would have less of an incentive to continue creating works 
and the public would suffer from this lack of creativity.11 The economic 
incentive theory has gained greater traction as technological progress places 
authors at a significant disadvantage to potential imitators.12 Particularly in 
the digital age, where the marginal costs and sometimes even the fixed costs 
of reproduction are effectively zero, imitators have a considerable advantage 
over creators.13 Consequently, content producers who bear significant fixed 
 
8 Compare William T. Ralston, Copyright in Computer-Composed Music: HAL Meets Handel, 
52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 281 (2005) (evaluating how copyright law might be applied to 
machine-authored musical works), with Jeffrey Malkan, Rule-Based Expression in Copyright Law, 57 
BUFF. L. REV. 433 (2009) (analyzing whether copyright should be extended to works that create 
rules for creating other works, of which machine-authored works could possibly be a category). 
9 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1986) (arguing that allocating rights to the licensed user of the program that 
generated the work is most compatible with traditional copyright law doctrine); Andrew J. Wu, From 
Video Games to Artificial Intelligence: Assigning Copyright Ownership to Works Generated by Increasingly 
Sophisticated Computer Programs, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 133 (1997) (evaluating and generating guidelines for 
granting copyright to non-derivative, computer-generated works). 
10 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the 
[Copyright] [C]lause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain 
is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors . . . .”). 
11 See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 
163 (2002–2003) (“Copyright law has traditionally centered on economic interests—assuring content 
creators and distributors means of appropriating sufficient return in the marketplace in order to 
promote investment in creative endeavors.”). 
12 See id. at 103 (“The ease with which digital technology enables anyone with a computer and 
an Internet connection to reproduce and make available for wide-scale distribution flawless 
reproductions of works of authorship has proven a far greater concern and more wrenching 
adjustment for copyright law . . . .”). 
13 See id. at 162-63 (“The rapid rise of peer-to-peer networks and the success of hackers in 
cracking and disseminating means of decrypting . . . demonstrate the vulnerability of the current 
network architecture to widespread unauthorized distribution and the relative impotence of existing 
legal protections.”). 
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costs in production and face uncertain payouts are placed in an even stronger 
position to demand enhanced copyright protection.14 
Yet, even within the economic rationale framework, machine-authored 
works present notable differences to traditional works. For example, with 
machine-authored articles, both the fixed and variable costs of producing each 
copyrightable article are effectively zero, which allows producers to compete 
with imitators even absent legal protection. Additionally, unlike a human 
author, the software program that constructs the article cannot be legally or 
economically incentivized to produce more or fewer works. For example, if 
an online sports writer discovers that he can generate stable income through 
his copyrighted articles, he is economically incentivized to write more articles. 
A software program, on the other hand, will follow its programming and 
generate articles regardless of such economic rewards.  
Two counterpoints might be offered to such an argument: first, that 
copyright protection is designed to motivate the software creator to create 
more software and, by extension, more creative works; and second, that 
copyright protection is designed to motivate users licensing the software to 
generate more creative works. However, these points are unpersuasive in the 
context of machine-authored news articles. As to the first, copyrightability 
can be extended to the software without being extended to the articles 
generated by the software. And as to the second, because control and 
profitability for modern electronic news depend on being first to market, 
copyrightability creates little incentive for the software end-user. Specifically, 
the value of electronic news peaks within the first six hours and then 
diminishes significantly.15 By the time copyright protection is secured, the 
residual value of the article is minimal.16  
Consequently, stringently mapping the existing copyright framework 
onto machine-authored works would implicate much of the cost of copyright 
protection but little of the benefit. For example, under a regime in which 
machine-authored works are de facto copyrightable, a single individual could, 
absent any contractual workarounds, own an indefinite number of copyrights. 
Such an individual could easily behave in ways that would hinder rather than 
promote future creative efforts. Consider the extreme hypothetical example of 
media conglomerate ANS with a machine-authorship program. Finding that a 
startup, FastNews, which produces articles comparable to its machine-authored 
 
14 See id. at 164 (“One of the key factors harmonizing [the social bargain between content 
producers and the public] has been the inherent limitations of analog technology platforms on 
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of works of authorship. . . . [D]igital technology 
platform[s] today . . . lack[] such constraints.”). 
15 See infra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing how the value of electronic news is 
measured by its website traffic, which declines significantly six hours after it is posted). 
16 See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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works, generates more traffic, ANS leverages several copyright infringement 
lawsuits at FastNews to shut it down. FastNews sells to ANS at a fraction of its 
valuation after being rendered illiquid by litigation expenses. A legal framework 
that permits a single party to aggregate a significant number of copyrights 
through minimal effort readily invites this type of anticompetitive behavior. 
This Comment makes several contributions to the scholarship on 
copyright law. First, it poses fundamental questions regarding the application 
of the existing copyright framework to the various players involved in 
creating machine-authored works—particularly with respect to identifying 
the legal author of the work. Second, it evaluates whether, in the case of 
machine-authored works, the human author should be allocated rights based on 
the economic incentive theory. It argues that inflexible application of 
copyright law creates a contribution/rights paradox because the party that 
contributed to the creation of the work—its author—is not the party to whom 
we would like to allocate copyright protection. Finally, the Comment posits 
that because copyrights provide little economic incentive to the players 
involved in creating machine-authored works, it would be inappropriate from 
a social policy standpoint to extend protection to such fully independent 
computer-generated works. 
Part I briefly discusses the purpose and basic requirements of copyright 
law, emphasizing the traditional stance that the incentives provided to the 
content producers are designed to purposefully, if indirectly, benefit the public. 
Part II discusses the legal nature and treatment of machine-authored works, 
specifically within the context of works that are fully and independently 
computer-generated.17 Part II also provides a brief overview of the technical 
components behind machine-authored works, distinguishes such works from 
subsequent human-authored derivative works, and highlights the legal 
treatment in jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. Part III discusses the 
numerous problems arising from affording full copyright protection to 
machine-authored works. This discussion, in part, reassesses how confident we 
should be that machine-authored works satisfy the legal requirements for 
copyright protection. Part IV concludes that applying the existing copyright 
framework would be inappropriate and discusses some alternative protection 
measures specifically targeting machine-authored works. It proposes three 
possible alternatives: (1) place machine-authored works immediately in the 
public domain; (2) assign a two-tier system of protection akin to quasi-property 
rights; or (3) assign the copyright to the programmer, but limit infringement 
to one-to-one identical copying. 
 
17 An example of one such work is the original article that Quakebot authored. See supra text 
accompanying notes 1–3. 
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I. PURPOSE AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
Courts have repeatedly stated that the primary purpose of copyright is to 
benefit the public.18 Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution empowered 
Congress to pass legislation to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries.”19 Indeed, the authority 
for Congress to pass the Copyright Act of 1909 and subsequent amendments 
came from this enumerated power of the U.S. Constitution.20 Thus, as 
commentators have properly noted, copyright protection is premised on the 
benefit a creative author can give to the public and the necessity of a copyright 
to realize such a benefit.21 By extension, copyright protection cannot be 
justified where no public benefit is conferred.22 
As amended, the Copyright Act of 1976 imposes two major requirements 
for copyrightability. Under the Act, to receive copyright protection, a work 
must be (1) of original authorship and (2) fixed in a tangible medium.23 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has read the first prong—originality—to also 
 
18 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate 
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate 
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”); see also Harper 
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“It is evident that the monopoly 
granted by copyright actively served its intended purpose of inducing the creation of new material 
of potential historical value.”). 
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
20 Id. 
21 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A], at 1-
88.18 (2011) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (“[T]he authorization to grant to individual 
authors the limited monopoly of copyright is predicated upon the dual premises that the public 
benefits from the creative activities of authors, and that the copyright monopoly is a necessary 
condition to the full realization of such creative activities.” (footnote omitted)); William M. Landes 
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (“A 
distinguishing characteristic of intellectual property is its ‘public good’ aspect. . . . For copyright law 
to promote economic efficiency, its principal legal doctrines must, at least approximately, maximize 
the benefits from creating additional works minus both the losses from limiting access and the costs 
of administering copyright protection.”); see also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A 
Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) (arguing 
that the only defensible justification of copyright is the economic balance between maximizing 
distribution and encouraging production of creative works). 
22 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, § 1.03[A], at 1-88.18 (“Implicit in this [copyright] 
rationale is the assumption that in the absence of such public benefit, the grant of a copyright monopoly 
to individuals would be unjustified.”); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 586 F. Supp. 911, 
913 (D. Minn. 1984) (quoting and citing Nimmer on Copyright with approval), rev’d, 770 F.2d 128 (8th 
Cir. 1985). 
23 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976). 
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require at least a modicum of creativity.24 I consider each of these requirements, 
original authorship and fixation in a tangible medium, in turn. 
While not defined in the statute, the term “original” has been subject to 
both congressional explanation and judicial interpretation. Notably, a House 
report explains that Congress purposefully left the phrase “original works of 
authorship” undefined to adopt the standard established by the courts at the 
time the legislation was passed.25 Courts, in turn, have adopted several rules 
to establish originality. Chief among them are two distinctions: (1) creative 
versus factual or “sweat-of-brow” works, and (2) works with attributed authorship 
versus works without attribution. First, courts are willing to uphold copyright 
protection for works with even the smallest amount of creativity26 but are 
unwilling to extend protection to facts, even if their discovery or compilation 
requires significant “sweat-of-brow” effort.27 Second, courts will grant 
copyright protection only to individuals who can prove that they independently 
generated the protectable elements of their work.28 For example, the plaintiff 
in Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc. tried to copyright the phrase “You’ve 
got to stand for something, or you’ll fall for anything.”29 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, affirmed the district court’s decision 
that the phrase lacked originality, since it had been used by Ginger Rogers, 
Martin Luther King, and even Abraham Lincoln.30 The court held that it was 
reasonable for the district court to conclude that “the prior usage of the saying 
 
24 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (discussing the 
holding in the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), in which the Court determined that “originality 
requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity”). 
25 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, § 2.01, at 2-5 to 2-6 (stating that “originality” was 
left undefined to incorporate changing standards); see also Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 
905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he one pervading element prerequisite to copyright protection regardless 
of the form of the work is the requirement of originality—that the work be the original product of the 
claimant.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 
489-90 (2d Cir. 1976))). 
26 See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951) (“All that 
is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute [requiring originality] is that the ‘author’ 
contributed something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something recognizably ‘his own.’ 
Originality in this context ‘means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
27 See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981) (refusing to 
grant copyright protection to a journalist’s research that Universal appropriated for its movie on the 
grounds that research is discovery of fact, which is not copyrightable); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 
U.S. at 363-64 (refusing to award copyright protection to a telephone book because there was no 
creativity in the arrangement of the work). 
28 See, e.g., Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 155 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) (declining 
to grant copyright protection over certain song lyrics because the phrase at issue had been attributed 
to multiple other songs and the plaintiff did not establish that it independently created the phrase). 
29 Id. at 141. 
30 Id. at 143. 
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was sufficiently widespread as to make it exceedingly unlikely . . . that [the 
plaintiff] had, in fact, independently created the phrase.”31 
The next requirement, fixation, demands that the work be embodied in a 
physical object recorded by or under the authority of the author and be 
sufficiently permanent to be perceived or reproduced with the aid of a 
machine.32 The embodiment can be digital, even if it is temporarily stored in 
a computer’s memory.33 Thus, the digital nature of a machine-authored work 
does not bar the work from being copyrightable on the grounds that it has 
not been properly fixed in a tangible medium. 
The historical context of the Copyright Act and its nuanced legal 
requirements establish a useful foundation for analyzing machine-authored 
works. First, the principal beneficiary of copyright protection is the public, not 
the author. Therefore, in determining whether a work should be copyrighted, 
the primary consideration should be the expected public benefit. Second, 
copyrightability depends on the creative nature of the work, not its labor 
intensiveness. Third, only the author is eligible for copyright protection; 
therefore, only the author’s filing for copyright protection can satisfy the first 
prong of the Copyright Act—works of original authorship.34 As such, when 
analyzing whether a novel type of work should be protected, the Copyright 
Office and courts should consider whether the copyrights are “the fruits of 
intellectual labor”35 that have been “founded in the creative powers of the 
mind”36 and would generate future benefit for the public good. 
II. MACHINE-AUTHORED WORKS 
A. Machine-Authored Works Defined 
Historically, courts have grappled with the issue of emerging technology 
and copyright protection. The iconic case of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony, for example, assessed whether a photograph could be copyrighted 
 
31 Id. at 144. 
32 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (providing that material to be copyrighted must be “fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”). 
33 See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1007-08 (N.D. Ill. 1982) 
(finding that the fixation requirement was satisfied where the audiovisual elements of the plaintiff ’s 
video games were written into storage even though some components of gameplay were only written 
in the machine’s random access, and thus, temporary, memory), aff ’d, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983). 
34 See, e.g., Gladys Music, Inc. v. Arch Music Co., 62 Civ. 1594, 1966 WL 7634, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 15, 1966) (finding that the plaintiff had secured exclusive rights and privileges to a song when 
he filed a certificate of registration). 
35 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (emphasis omitted). 
36 Id. 
1254 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1241 
even though a camera, not a person, had physically created the work.37 
Burrow-Giles perfectly highlights the emerging tension between technology 
and copyright protection because photographs were a novel technology at the 
time of the case and had not been previously contemplated by the Copyright 
Act of 1802.38 The Burrow-Giles Court found that the human behind the 
camera was the true author, and thus entitled to the “exclusive right to use, 
publish and sell” the photograph, because he was the one who composed the 
image.39 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Miller found that by posing 
Oscar Wilde in a particular way, in a certain costume, and under particular 
lighting, Sarony exercised sufficient control over the photographic product 
for it to constitute an original work of art.40 In this case, the camera was 
merely a tool that helped facilitate the fixation of the author’s creativity.41  
This reasoning has continued to hold even in cases where a machine does 
the bulk of the work.42 A modern example can be found in Stern Electronics, 
Inc. v. Kaufman, in which the Second Circuit held that video games were 
copyrightable even though computer programs generated the audiovisual 
displays.43 Breaking down the analysis by element, the court stated, 
Someone first conceived what the audiovisual display would look like and sound 
like. Originality occurred at that point. Then the program was written. Finally, 
the program was imprinted into the memory devices so that, in operation with 
the components of the game, the sights and sounds could be seen and heard. 
The resulting display satisfies the requirement of an original work.44 
In some ways, a machine-authored work appears to be the next logical 
stepping stone. But machine-authored works are unique in at least one 
important respect: there is no human input in the generation of the work in 
question. The software itself generates content through a natural language 
system, a style of coding (rather than a language itself) that focuses on 
 
37 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
38 See id. at 58 (“The only reason why photographs were not included in the extended list in 
the act of 1802 is probably that they did not exist, as photography as an art was then unknown . . . .”). 
39 See id. at 54-60 (noting that the plaintiff made the photograph “entirely from his own 
original mental conception, . . . arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging 
and disposing the light and shade” and holding that these findings “show this photograph to be an 
original work of art”). 
40 Id. at 60. 
41 See id. at 60-61 (recognizing that this is a case of first impression, but finding persuasive the 
reasoning in Nottage v. Jackson, [1883] 11 QB 627 (Eng.), that “‘author’ involves originating, making, 
producing, as the inventive or master mind, the thing which is to be protected”). 
42 See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1014 (1982) (upholding 
copyright protection for video games, which are primarily machine-operated). 
43 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982). 
44 Id. at 856-57. 
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decisionmaking.45 At every step of the creation process, it makes choices as 
to content, format and organization, style, packaging, and syntax. Ostensibly 
sophisticated, the process can be broken down into two core steps: text 
planning and sentence planning. In the first step, the program determines 
what information to communicate and how to structure the information into 
coherent text. In the second step, the program parses through possible lexical 
choices and makes decisions about what structures to use. In many ways, when 
creating a work, the program thinks much as a human brain would. 
To make concrete the abstract legal relationships involved in generating a 
machined-authored work, consider the creation of a machine-authored work 
from beginning to end. For simplicity, assume that a single person, Adam, 
wrote a program named “Bot” on his computer. Bot takes statistics from 
NFL.com and combines them with a natural language algorithm, which 
Adam coded, to generate a news article that recaps the score and notable plays 
of any football game. Adam then licenses Bot to Charles, who publishes a 
dozen articles on football games that Bot generated in the past week. 
Existing jurisprudence will allow Adam to copyright his source code for 
Bot. Following the reasoning in Burrow-Giles, Adam is the author, as he used 
a machine—his computer—to channel his creative energies to generate a 
protectable work—a software program—that is fixed in a tangible medium on 
his hard drive.46 As the author and owner, Adam is entitled to license his 
program out to Charles to use.47 The questions left unanswered by current 
jurisprudence concern the copyrightability of the dozen articles that Bot 
generated for Charles: Would Charles be considered the author of these works 
since he was the one who commanded Bot to generate the articles? Would 
these works be considered derivative works of the original Bot program, 
making Adam the author? Might Charles and Adam be joint authors? Could 
Bot itself be an author? 
B. Copyrightability of Machine-Authored Works 
When the issue of machine-authored works was first contemplated, the 
Register of Copyrights did not determine whether these works would be 
copyrightable.48 Rather, the Register stated, “The crucial question appears to 
 
45 See generally EHUD REITER & ROBERT DALE, BUILDING NATURAL LANGUAGE 
GENERATION SYSTEMS (2000) (discussing the various aspects and technical features of creating a 
natural language generation system). 
46 See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
47 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (noting that Copyright protection subsists “in original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated”). 
48 See COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS 1, 5 (1966) (recognizing the need for change in copyright law and electing to begin 
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be whether the ‘work’ is basically one of human authorship, with the computer 
merely being an assisting instrument, or whether the traditional elements of 
authorship . . . were actually conceived and executed not by a man but by a 
machine.”49 Official reports by the National Commission on New Technological 
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) and the United States Congress 
Office of Technology Assessment elected not to resolve the issue, noting that 
machine-authored works were too far in the future to address and that there 
were too many ambiguities to resolve at that time.50 
This governmental hesitance has not stopped legal commentators from 
analyzing how machine-authored works should be treated. Indeed, as one 
commentator noted, the existing copyright framework can be readily applied 
to the context of machine-authored works.51 After all, whether works are 
composed by humans or machines, the same fundamental requirements of 
originality, fixation, and modicum of creativity apply. 
In analyzing originality, it is important to recall that courts have repeatedly 
refused to determine what is or is not “original enough” to warrant copyright 
protection, emphasizing that it is not the court’s role to judge the artistic 
merits of the work.52 That said, the elementary and somewhat factual nature 
of machine-authored works may be irrelevant to establishing originality, 
especially since many of these works are indistinguishable from their human-
created counterparts. Consequently, many commentators have concluded that 
the particular expression of the facts by the machine-author is sufficient to 
establish originality.53 
Extending from originality is the requirement for a modicum of creativity. 
In some jurisdictions, even the slightest amount of creativity, including “[a] 
copyist’s bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of 
 
considering technological differences rather than applying the traditional copyright framework to 
all works irrespective of technology). 
49 Id. at 5. 
50 See Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-
Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1044-45 (1993) (“CONTU 
concluded unanimously that the artificial intelligence Register Kaminstein had envisioned eight 
years earlier had not yet been developed and was not immediately foreseeable.”). 
51 See id. at 1054 (“[T]echnological developments have not outstripped the capacity of our 
current copyright law to adapt to the creative opportunities offered by new technologies.”). 
52 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a 
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of 
the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”); Alfred Bell 
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (“[T]he courts have not undertaken 
to assume the functions of critics, or to measure carefully the degree of originality, or literary skill 
or training involved.”). 
53 See Miller, supra note 50, at 1049 (arguing that the existing copyright framework can apply 
to machine-authored works); Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1195-96 (concluding that machine-authored 
works can be original enough to be copyrighted); Wu, supra note 9, at 148-49 (discussing to whom 
to award the copyright based on a multifactor test analyzing contributions to the originality). 
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thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations.”54 Given that a 
computer program uses natural language algorithms to generate unique 
expressions of the same set of facts, courts are very likely to find the minimal 
level of creativity necessary for copyright protection. 
While the fixation element would readily be satisfied, there is a question 
of who fixed the work. While most cases suggest that the user fixed the work 
by initiating the program,55 there is also a possible claim that the computer 
programmer is the one who fixed the work.56 
III. PROBLEMS OF APPLYING TRADITIONAL  
COPYRIGHT FRAMEWORK 
The issue of fixation segues into the larger and more hotly contested issue 
of authorship. Authorship presents significant problems for applying the 
traditional copyright framework to machine-authored works. Different 
scholars have proposed that the machine author, programmer, end-user, and 
joint variants (programmer and machine, end-user and machine, programmer 
and end-user) be considered the author who should receive copyright 
protection.57 Each proposal has an intuitive reasoning seemingly grounded in 
traditional copyright doctrine. But, on closer inspection, each is inconsistent 
with copyright policy. 
A. Authorship and Ownership 
1. Machine as Author 
One possibility is for the machine or software program to be awarded 
authorship. Such an allocation would be consistent with the court’s historical 
approach of awarding authorship to the entity that is the actual creative force 
 
54 Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 105; see also Wu, supra note 9, at 152-53 (quoting Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d 
at 105); cf. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting a copyright 
claim in licensed plastic toys based on Mickey Mouse and holding that originality for the derivative 
work must (1) be nontrivial and (2) reflect the degree to which it relies on preexisting material and 
not affect the copyright scope of that preexisting material); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 
486, 493-94 (2d Cir. 1976) (rejecting for copyrightability a derivative Uncle Sam Mechanical Bank, 
holding that the author must contribute substantial, not merely trivial, originality). 
55 See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding the fixation 
element satisfied in Stern’s video game Scrabble because the same sequence appears numerous times 
whenever a player starts a match). 
56 See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding 
that the fixation requirement is met in Williams’s video game Defender even though “new” images 
are generated between play mode and attract mode). 
57 See generally Samuelson, supra note 9 (discussing at length the possible permutations of rights 
that could be assigned to various players that contribute to the creation of a machine-authored work). 
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behind the copyrightable work.58 However, while the machine is unequivocally 
the entity that generated the actual end product, assigning ownership to the 
machine raises a significant legal issue, as software and machinery have no 
legal personhood.59 Despite the logical rationale behind such allocation, it is 
unlikely that courts will grant a copyright to an entity with no legal personhood. 
2. Programmer as Author 
The programmer has undoubtedly made the largest contribution to the 
originality and creativity of the machine-authored work. The programmer 
conceived of how he could create a software program that generates literary 
works, crafted a plan to build that program, generated the necessary coding, 
and troubleshoots all of the bugs preventing the program from executing 
properly. Consequently, one might argue that any machine-authored work 
product is enabled only through the ingenuity of the programmer. Following 
this intuition, it would be reasonable to allocate the copyright of the 
machine-authored work to the programmer. However, because the work was 
ultimately created independent of any direct input from the programmer, it 
is unclear whether the programmer should be entitled to any statutory claim 
on anything beyond the original software. 
Of course, one could argue that the works created by the software are 
derivative works based off of the original programming.60 However, the 
traditional application of derivative works requires that the work not just 
satisfy the intuitive definition of “based on” (i.e., but-for causation), but that 
the work be predicated upon, or built off of, the previous work.61 As such, 
legally classifying machine-authored works as derivative works would be 
inaccurate because the works are not based on a “recognizable block of 
expression from the program.”62 
 
58 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
59 See Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1199 (“Despite the fact that the statute does not require that 
one be human to qualify as an author, is it still fair to say that it was not within Congress’ 
contemplation to grant intellectual property rights to machines. In the long history of the copyright 
system, rights have been allocated only to humans.”). 
60 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining a “derivative work” as “a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works”). 
61 Id.; see also, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980) (“First, 
to support a copyright the original aspects of a derivative work must be more than trivial. Second, 
the scope of protection afforded a derivative work must reflect the degree to which it relies on 
preexisting material and must not in any way affect the scope of any copyright protection in that 
preexisting material.”). 
62 Darin Glasser, Copyrights in Computer-Generated Works: Whom, if Anyone, Do We Reward?, 
2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 24, ¶ 18; see also Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(explaining that one prong of copyright’s “substantial similarity” test “is used to determine whether 
two works are substantially similar in their ‘forms of expression’”); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 
1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that to “constitute a violation of section 106(2) the infringing work 
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3. End-User as Author 
Allocating rights to the end-user seems to make the most economic sense. 
Indeed, CONTU favored this allocation in its assessment when it stated, 
“[The] obvious answer [to the question of who is the author of a computer-
generated work] is that the author is [the] one who employs the computer.”63 
Notably, this assessment was predicated upon the perception that the user 
would have a substantial contribution in shaping the output.64 As such, this 
position becomes difficult to defend when the role of the user is close to 
nonexistent since anyone claiming authorship rights must have tinkered with 
the subject matter to make the work indisputably his own.65  
Because the user has to engage the program for it to produce an output 
(e.g., typing “start” or clicking a button), one could make a tenuous argument 
that such action constitutes the level of contribution necessary to warrant 
protection. We might think of the program as similar to a camera or other 
mechanical device, and users of these devices are often considered the authors 
of the creative works produced.66 However, this argument fails to address that 
the creative decision made when generating machine-authored works is much 
more limited than the creative decision made when producing a work with 
a camera or recording device. Unlike the lithographer in Burrow-Giles, the 
end-user of a computer program makes no real decision as to composition or 
arrangement. Consequently, it is difficult to argue that the program is assisting 
in human creativity. 
4. Joint Authorship 
Assigning joint authorship (in any permutation) appears, at first glance, 
to nicely avoid the question of who is the primary author of the work. After 
all, each author has played a role in the creation of the final product, so it 
seems to make sense that copyright protection be afforded to all contributors. 
 
must incorporate in some form a portion of the copyrighted work”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 
supra note 21, § 3.06, at 3-34.29 (“All works are composed of pre-existing elements—whether words, 
paints or shapes, musical notes, or otherwise. But it does not follow that all works are therefore 
derivative or collective.”). 
63 Miller, supra note 50, at 1056 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting NAT’L COMM’N 
ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 45 (1979)). 
64 See id. at 1045 (viewing the computer as “a tool to assist a human author”). 
65 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, § 2.01[A], at 2-9 (explaining the meaning of 
originality in the copyright sense, and stating that a work is original if it is “a product of the 
independent efforts of its author”). 
66 See Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1202 (explaining that, under copyright law, someone who 
tape-records a live musical performance is considered the author of the sound recording produced, 
even though the user’s creative input consisted only of pressing the “record” button). 
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However, joint authorship allocation raises more problems than it solves. The 
primary problem is the existing legal standard for “joint work,” which requires 
(1) that each individual’s contribution be independently copyrightable67 and 
(2) that each individual prepared his contribution with the intent that the 
works would be joined together into an inseparable and unitary whole.68 
The machine-authored work would likely fail both components of the 
legal test for a joint work. On the first component, it is unclear what the 
programmer contributed to the machine-authored work. His contribution 
could be the software programming, but, because his code can be copyrighted 
separately, such an arrangement would allow for double dipping. If the code 
cannot be considered his contribution, the programmer would have contributed 
nothing to the scheme. Additionally, the end-user’s contribution of button 
pressing or word typing is unlikely to be independently copyrightable because 
the act of pressing a button or typing a word is unlikely to be original or 
contain a modicum of creativity as a matter of law. On the second component, 
it is difficult to argue that the programmer intended for all of his licensees to 
collaborate with him on a joint venture because the parties who will later use 
the software were not identified at the time the program was created. The 
standard for joint works, which requires that both parties intended at the time 
of initial bargaining that their works be combined,69 is therefore unlikely to 
be satisfied. Thus, while assigning joint authorship might seem attractive at 
first, it is a relatively untenable solution. 
B. The Contribution/Rights Paradox 
Let us assume that copyright contributions of the individual human entities 
leading to the creation of the machine-authored work created assignable 
authorship rights. The second problem that arises is that no variation of 
copyright attribution and ownership allocation both satisfies the elements of 
the statute as construed by court precedent and remains consistent with 
public policy. 
Accepting for the present that the actual software is not a legal entity 
capable of owning a copyright, we will consider awarding the protection to 
one of the two parties remaining: the programmer and the end-user. On the 
one hand, copyright law is predicated on incentivizing the creative author. In 
 
67 See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that, for a work to meet 
the statutory definition of “joint work,” the contribution of each joint author must be copyrightable). 
68 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 731-32 (1989) (finding that the 
parties could be joint authors in a sculpture work if they “prepared the work ‘with the intention that 
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole’” (quoting 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988))). 
69 Id. 
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the case of machine-authored works, the programmer has contributed the 
most creative effort to the resulting work and could presumably secure the 
copyright. Applying the traditional copyright law framework, we can readily 
conclude that the programmer should be granted copyright protection on all 
machine-authored works. On the other hand, allowing the programmer to 
copyright not only his software but also any subsequent outputs over-rewards 
him for his efforts70 and invites copyright stockpiling. A program like 
Quakebot might produce only a few dozen articles per year because its work 
is constrained to natural disasters, but a machine-author that writes on 
breaking news could produce a few dozen articles per day, each with copyright 
protection assigned to the programmer. While it is possible for other creators 
to write on the underlying facts through their own expression, this allocation 
regime would result in further copyright infringement litigation that would 
not be to the benefit of a public already inundated with copyright takedown 
notifications and DMCA claims.71 
Allocating the copyright to the end-user ostensibly makes more sense 
from both social policy and economic standpoints. Because the end-user is 
ultimately the one who determines whether a machine-authored work is 
produced, economic incentives should align the interests of the end-user with 
the interests of the general public because the end-user determines the 
volume and quality of articles that fill the market. The programmer is 
incentivized to create the software independently of economic incentives to 
generate machine-authored works because his or her code is already entitled to 
copyright protection. If we are concerned with incentivizing the production 
of more creative works, it seems better to award copyright protection to the 
end-user, who is far more likely to play a meaningful role in generating works 
 
70 See JOHN HAUGELAND, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE VERY IDEA 12 (1985) (noting 
that since the products created by the program are not predicted by the original programmer, the 
programmer should not be rewarded for those works). 
71 See, e.g., Chris Welch, Google Received over 75 Million Copyright Takedown Requests in February, 
VERGE (Mar. 7, 2016, 11:02 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/3/7/11172516/google-takedown-
requests-75-million [https://perma.cc/WBP5-4K9D] (highlighting Google’s receipt of 75 million 
requests to take down copyright-infringing URLs in March 2016, and noting that the majority of 
the notices are legitimate); see also Andy, Google DMCA Notice Record Smashed Again – But Why?, 
TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 6, 2015), https://torrentfreak.com/google-dmca-notice-record-smashed-again
-but-why-150906 [https://perma.cc/5WRG-4E8T] (discussing how websites are using multiple 
domains to circumvent blocking efforts, leading to a vicious cycle of increasing takedowns); Andy 
Smith, YouTube Taking Steps to Improve False Copyright Claims, TUBULARINSIGHTS (Feb. 29, 2016), 
http://www.tubularinsights.com/youtube-false-copyright-claims [https://perma.cc/28GK-KUJ8] 
(discussing YouTube’s efforts to combat takedown abusers who report videos that actually did not 
infringe copyright). 
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than the programmer.72 In news production, for example, an end-user, like 
the L.A. Times, plays a larger role in pushing news into the public sphere than 
would the software company that created the machine author because it 
determines what news articles are publication-worthy and what nuances 
should be emphasized within a given article. However, under traditional 
copyright doctrine, it would be difficult for the end-user to secure a copyright 
because he has contributed very little to the creative process and holds the 
weakest claim to any copyrightable contribution.73 The mere action of 
pressing a button would likely not satisfy the modicum of creativity standard 
established in Feist. 
Thus, the contribution/rights paradox exists because the party that can 
secure the copyright is not the party that merits copyright protection. One 
way to avoid this paradox would be to consider the creative contribution of 
the programmer in determining whether to grant copyright protection, but 
to allocate the right to the machine-authored work to the end-user once the 
copyright is granted. While this would be desirable from a social policy 
standpoint and still satisfy the legal requirements for copyrightability, such a 
framework contravenes the language of the Copyright Act. Specifically, 17 
U.S.C. § 106 states that the exclusive rights in copyrighted works are conferred 
to the “owner,” referring to the “author” of the copyrightable work. To qualify 
as an author, a party must have contributed to the copyrightable work.74 A 
framework that assesses copyrightability based on the contribution of the 
programmer but grants protection to the end-user would end up granting 
protection to a non-author as defined by § 106. Absent the work-product 
doctrine, it would be illogical and legally impermissible for a court to determine 
that an individual’s original and creative contribution de facto gives rise to 
copyright protection for another individual. This holds true despite the fact 
that the programmer may have licensed his software to the end-user.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 See Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1203-04 (discussing the economic factors and technical 
expertise that place the end-user of a generator program in a superior position to evaluate a machine-
authored work). 
73 Id. at 1201-02. 
74 See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951) (“All 
that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the ‘author’ contributed 
something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something recognizably ‘his own.’”). 
75 See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that because a 
company was a licensee of the defendant’s software, it was not an owner, was not entitled to the 
rights of an owner, and was not entitled to invoke copyright defenses such as the first sale doctrine). 
2017] The Machine Author 1263 
 
The contribution/rights paradox is succinctly illustrated in the table below: 
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Pros 
• Best balances creative 
contribution and right to 
authorship in a manner 
consistent with the statute 
Cons 
• Over-rewards the 
programmer by creating a 
monopoly over 
copyrightable works 
Pros 
• Best evaluation of 
copyrightability contribution 
• Assigned rights do not create 
a monopoly 
Cons 
• Grants copyright protection 
to a non-author in violation of 
17 U.S.C. § 106. Person 
evaluated as author for 
copyrightability is not the one 
who receives rights
E
nd
-U
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r 
Pros 
• None 
Cons 
• Copyrightability evaluated 
on the party that 
contributed the least, rights 
allocation leads to 
monopoly. Grants copyright 
protection to a non-author 
in violation of § 106 
Pros 
• Assigned rights do not create 
a monopoly 
• Assignee has economic and 
technical expertise to 
determine value of 
copyrightable work 
Cons 
• Difficult to make argument 
that the contributions were 
original and creative
C. Social Policy Arguments for Not Protecting Machine-Authored Works 
The broader issue that remains unaddressed is whether machine-authored 
works require copyright protection at all. Recall that creative works are 
provided copyright protection for public benefit; the temporary grant of an 
intellectual property monopoly serves as an economic incentive for producers 
to create works for the public. I consider now whether copyright allocation for 
the programmer or the end-user within the context of machine-authored works 
would fulfill the Copyright Act’s intended purpose of benefitting the public. 
Even at first cut, it is unclear how allowing the programmer to copyright 
works produced by its software would further the purpose of copyright law. 
In terms of economic incentives, the programmer is incentivized to produce 
works through the copyright protection that is afforded to his code. It is 
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difficult to construct a cogent argument for how granting additional protection 
would further incentivize this creative behavior. Such additional protection 
does not exist in other areas of intellectual property.76 One possible argument 
concerns derivative works, but, as previously discussed, the machine-authored 
work does not predicate on the coding in the same way that, for example, a 
movie might be made using a copyrighted character (e.g., Mickey Mouse). A 
better analogy might be to a person who buys a digital camera and then takes 
some pictures. The software coding that enables the camera to function might 
be copyrighted, but that does not entitle the copyright holder to stake a claim 
on the pictures created by the photographer. At best, allocating the copyright 
to the programmer would create few additional incentives for other programmers 
to code programs that generate machine-authored works. At worst, such a 
regime would enable widespread monopolization of all future works generated 
by a single software program, skewing the law disproportionately in favor of 
content producers to the detriment of the public. 
A slightly more reasonable argument is that copyright protection may 
incentivize the end-user to produce more creative works. But, in the economic 
calculus, giving copyright protection to machine-authored works should, in 
theory, neither add nor remove incentives for the end-user. The cost of 
production for the end-user is, after all, zero. The end-user must license the 
software from the programmer and would need to pay that cost, but it can 
hardly be said that the cost is recouped through the copyright protection 
granted to the articles generated. In fact, in the digital market, high demand 
for immediately consumable media creates a powerful first-to-market 
economic incentive that exists independently of any copyright protection.77 
Because most websites generate revenue through advertisement, website 
traffic—the total number of visitors to a website—becomes the primary 
metric of economic success.78 In the area of online news, increasing traffic 
 
76 For example, in patent law, an inventor is entitled to patent his own work but is not de facto 
entitled to a patent on any work based on his patent. See Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 
1993) (“To prove derivation in a[] [patent] interference proceeding, the person attacking the patent 
must establish prior conception of the claimed subject matter and communication of the conception to 
the adverse claimant.”). See generally 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS (2008). 
77 See, e.g., Aydin Çelen, Tarkan Erdoğan & Erol Taymaz, Fast Moving Consumer Goods: 
Competitive Conditions and Policies 32-33 (Econ. Research Ctr., Working Paper in Economics 05/13, 
2005) (finding, through an empirical study on Turkey’s market, that fast-moving goods are 
competitive and, therefore, that regulation may be unnecessary so its implementation should be 
considered with care). 
78 See Shaun Quarton, 7 Key Metrics to Track the Success of Your Website, TORQUE (Mar. 5, 2015), 
http://torquemag.io/2015/03/7-key-website-metrics-track [https://perma.cc/58DV-N74D] (noting that 
traffic volume is fundamentally important because it tracks growth and thus revenue). 
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means getting new information to publication as quickly as possible.79 The 
time it would take for the Copyright Office to grant copyright protection for 
a given article would likely exceed the useful lifespan of the article many times 
over.80 Thus, there is no real additional social benefit to granting the end-user 
copyright protection. 
The first-mover economic incentive in digital media exists regardless of 
whether the work receives copyright protection. Since none of the traditional 
benefits of copyright protection hold in the case of machine-authored works, 
copyright makes an end-user no more or less likely to produce. Because the 
copyright protection process for online media moves too slowly to meaningfully 
provide a public economic benefit, it would not make sense from a social 
policy standpoint to extend such protection. 
IV. PROTECTION PROPOSALS DESIGNED FOR  
MACHINE-AUTHORED WORKS 
Given how machine-authored works fit in the existing jurisprudence, an 
alternative protection scheme should be devised to support beneficial social 
policy. This Part contemplates three potential schemes and examines their 
respective shortcomings. 
A. Immediate Entry into the Public Domain 
One possible treatment would be for all machine-authored works to enter 
into the public domain immediately. On its face, this proposition seems 
extreme—it appears to deprive the theoretical legal author of rights that would 
traditionally have been allocated to him. Upon scrutiny, however, this treatment 
offers several practical benefits and has relatively few drawbacks. 
Under this treatment, the true “author” of the machine-authored work is 
in fact the software. Because the software is not a legal entity, this treatment 
would not deprive it of any rights, as it has no legal rights to begin with. 
Further, the programmer would receive adequate compensation and legal 
protection through the copyrightability of her code. And the end-user, while 
deprived of the opportunity to copyright the original machine-authored 
work, could nevertheless copyright any derivative works that she creates using 
the machine-authored work as a springboard. Indeed, in the case of the Los 
 
79 See, e.g., MARK BRIGGS, JOURNALISM NEXT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO DIGITAL REPORTING 
AND PUBLISHING 57 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing how Twitter’s reporting simplicity allowed it to 
acquire a first-mover advantage). 
80 See Carlos Castillo, Mohammad El-Haddad, Jürgen Pfeffer & Matt Stempeck, 
Characterizing the Life Cycle of Online News Stories Using Social Media Reactions, PROC. 17TH ACM 
CONF. ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK & SOC. COMPUTING 211, 214-15 (2014) 
(finding a steep drop in the number of visitors six hours after an article has been published). 
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Angeles Times and Quakebot, the revised and finalized article published on the 
L.A. Times’s website would likely remain copyrightable under this framework. 
Assuming that the work of the journalists and editors in fleshing out the 
article was sufficient to satisfy the standards of originality and creativity, the 
works of human creativity built on the foundation of machine authors would 
retain their entitlement to copyright protection. In one sense, then, placing 
all machine-authored works in the public domain would promote the public’s 
interest in access to creative works without unduly stifling creative incentives 
to the content producers. 
The strongest criticism of this framework is the practical difficulty in 
execution. Given how difficult it can be to distinguish human works and 
machine-authored works, demonstrating to the Copyright Office that the work 
is human-generated rather than machine-created will prove increasingly more 
complex. Currently, machine authors produce only relatively simple articles 
composed primarily of facts and statistics. However, it is plausible to imagine, 
in the not-so-distant future, a much more sophisticated machine author that 
can compose eloquent novels. A potential solution would be to direct 
programmers to embed some kind of watermark in the machine-authored 
output, but there would of course be practical workarounds.  
Notably, however, this criticism neglects to recognize the dual nature of 
copyright protection. A copyright must be enforced to have teeth: if such a 
framework were adopted, alleged infringers would have to establish through 
evidence that the work in question was machine-authored and that the 
copyright protection is invalid. Thus, this public domain framework would 
have the practical effect of increasing the difficulty of enforcing false 
copyrights and deterring litigation. 
B. End-User: The Quasi-Property Treatment 
If copyright protection must be given to the end-user in some manner, one 
possible allocation would be a quasi-property right that affords the end-user 
full rights against direct competitors within the industry but not against 
members of the general public. An excellent example of such a quasi-property 
right can be found in International News Services v. Associated Press.81 In this 
case, the two parties were competing news services that reported during 
 
81 See 248 U.S. 215, 230 (1918) (“The right of the purchaser of a single newspaper to spread 
knowledge of its contents gratuitously, for any legitimate purpose not unreasonably interfering with 
complainant’s right to make merchandise of it, may be admitted; but to transmit that news for 
commercial use, in competition with complainant—which is what defendant has done and seeks to 
justify—is a very different matter.”). 
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World War I.82 While the Associated Press (AP) reported directly from the 
front, the Allied Powers had effectively banned International News Services 
(INS) from reporting on the news.83 As a workaround, INS accessed AP news 
through the AP news bulletin, rewrote the news, and published it as their own 
hours later in the West.84 Consequently, AP filed a lawsuit against INS. INS 
contended that the underlying facts in AP’s news articles were unprotected 
and that their rewritings did not infringe on the particular expression of AP’s 
copyrighted works.85 The Supreme Court held that a quasi-property right 
could be created against INS because AP created the material as a result of the 
expenditure of labor, skill, and money.86 In effect, INS’s actions constituted 
misappropriation that deprived AP of the full benefits of its labor.87 
The holding of INS v. AP has been weakened in many ways since 1918. 
After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, the case carries little authority because it 
relies on federal common law.88 Further, later courts have held that “sweat of 
brow” work is unprotected.89 Some courts have created narrow exceptions for 
“hot news,” where the information is generated at a cost and is time sensitive.90 
 
82 See id. at 230 (“The parties are in the keenest competition between themselves in the 
distribution of news throughout the United States . . . .”). 
83 News Pirating Case in Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1918, at 14. 
84 See Associated Press v. Int’l News Servs., 240 F. 983, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (discussing how 
INS paid individuals with access to the AP bulletin to furnish news such as the German raid on the 
east coast of England). 
85 INS, 248 U.S. at 233. 
86 See id. at 236 (“[A]lthough we may and do assume that neither party has any remaining 
property interest as against the public in uncopyrighted news matter after the moment of its first 
publication, it by no means follows that there is no remaining property interest in it as between 
[INS and AP]. For . . . news matter . . . is stock in trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise, 
organization, skill, labor, and money, and . . . we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, 
and as between [the parties], it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of either 
as against the public.”). 
87 See id. at 240 (“But in a court of equity, where the question is one of unfair competition, if 
that which complainant has acquired fairly at substantial cost may be sold fairly at substantial profit, 
a competitor who is misappropriating it for the purpose of disposing of it to his own profit and to 
the disadvantage of complainant cannot be heard to say that it is too fugitive or evanescent to be 
regarded as property.”). 
88 See 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that there is no “federal general common law” and 
mandating that federal courts apply substantive state law to resolving claims under state law); see 
also Paul Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 49, 49 (“It 
has been suggested that the credence due the International News Service case today is minimal: that 
subsequent decisions have restricted its doctrine to the news context and that, in any event, it is but 
a derelict of the federal common law, untenable after Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.”). 
89 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991) (“Decisions of this Court 
applying the 1909 Act make clear that the statute did not permit the ‘sweat of the brow’ approach.”). 
90 See, e.g., NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that “hot news” 
misappropriation claims were permitted on the grounds that, without protection of property rights 
in this information, there would not be an incentive to collect and distribute time-sensitive news 
and the public would suffer accordingly). 
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Even then, the Copyright Act of 1976 may preempt the misappropriation 
claim.91 Machine-authored works are an excellent fit for a “hot-news” 
exception. The immediacy of the news being reported is the precise reason for 
using a machine author, and, if it becomes necessary to allocate rights to the 
end-user, limiting the scope of those rights to competition within the industry 
strikes a better balance for advancing the public interest. An end-user would 
be protected from potential competitors capitalizing on the timeliness of the 
end-user’s information, which is the fundamental value proposition of the 
machine-author software. At the same time, the public would not be 
prevented from using the works. The end-user would have no rightful claim 
against the public because allowing these claims would be detrimental to the 
public interest. 
Granted, applying a quasi-property framework within the context of 
machine-authored works may require more nuance with machine-authored 
works than was required with their predecessors. One might argue that the 
quasi-property right effectively raises a first-to-market issue, allowing the 
fastest party to secure the quasi-property right and rendering everyone else 
an infringer. This would be problematic in the machine-author context, as the 
same software could be licensed out to multiple parties to generate works 
simultaneously, potentially rendering it impossible to determine who should 
hold the right. Furthermore, machines will always operate faster than humans, 
and a quasi-property treatment might render most journalism to be infringing. 
Notably, in INS, the two parties did not independently generate works 
based on the same set of underlying facts. Rather, one party clearly 
misappropriated the efforts of the other. Thus, it could easily be the case that 
quasi-property rights are assigned to anyone who has created a work through 
her own efforts, with no liability in the absence of misappropriation. Such 
treatment would protect a content producer by continuing to punish infringers 
who obtain an unfair advantage through misappropriation while neatly 
circumventing the potential technical issues that could arise. 
C. Programmer Allocation: One-for-One Matching 
If copyright protection is granted directly to the programmer, the scope 
of protection should be very narrow in light of the potential for copyright 
stockpiling. For instance, the right of the programmer could be reduced to 
only protect against one-to-one copying of the underlying source, where 
infringement occurs only if an ordinary person applying contemporaneous 
 
91 See Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(finding that the plaintiffs’ “hot news” misappropriation claim was preempted by federal copyright 
law). But see NBA, 105 F.3d at 852 (concluding that “only a narrow ‘hot-news’ misappropriation claim 
survives preemption for actions concerning material within the realm of copyright”). 
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standards would find the work to be a direct copy. While this may raise some 
concerns of judicial activism, a standard with room for judicial discretion is 
not novel.92 Allowing courts to find infringement through a reasonable 
person test would empower victims of bona fide infringement to bring cases 
while deterring frivolous litigation. 
Any stronger treatment, especially a broad general grant of copyright 
protection such as that which has historically been found in other media, 
would give the programmer far too much bargaining power, akin to a 
monopoly. This is especially true because, in practice, the programmer is 
likely to be a corporation.93 With far more resources than any one individual, 
these entities are much more likely to protect their intellectual property 
through litigation. The hazards of affording copyright protection to a single 
programmer are thus greatly exacerbated by the for-profit nature of coders in 
application, making it all the more important that the copyright—should it 
be afforded to the programmer—be as thin as possible. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Crown of England first found it necessary to incentivize 
creativity, it passed the Statute of Anne 1710.94 When Congress found a 
similar need in the United States, it passed the Copyright Act of 1790.95 Since 
then, every amendment96 and extension has been passed on the claim that it 
would promote creativity and benefit the public good.97 Now, not for the first 
 
92 For example, the Supreme Court had, in the context of obscenity, considered an “I know it 
when I see it” rule. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall 
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that 
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it 
when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”); see also Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973) (establishing a reasonable person test to determine obscenity). 
93 For a list of natural language processing startups with an average valuation of $5.1 million a 
piece, see Natural Language Processing Startups, ANGELLIST https://angel.co/natural-language-processing 
[https://perma.cc/V3E2-4S98]. 
94 8 Anne c. 19 (Eng.). 
95 Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124. 
96 For example, the subject category was expanded in 1909 from maps, charts, and books to all 
works of an author, and again in 1976 to an open list with eight major categories. See An Act to 
Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909); 
see also Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
97 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 3 (1996) (“[The Copyright Term Extension Act] will provide 
significant trade benefits . . . while ensuring fair compensation for American creators who deserve 
to benefit fully from the exploitation of their works. Moreover, by stimulating the creation of new 
works and providing enhanced economic incentives to preserve existing works, such an extension 
will enhance the long-term volume, vitality and accessibility of the public domain.”). Although this 
is the underlying policy argument, often in practice the amendments or extensions have had the 
opposite effect. See, e.g., Steve Schlackman, How Mickey Mouse Keeps Changing Copyright Law, ART 
L.J. (Feb. 15, 2014), http://artlawjournal.com/mickey-mouse-keeps-changing-copyright-law [https://
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time, we face the question of whether extending copyright protection to a 
new class of works—those created by machine authors—is to the benefit of 
the general public. 
Journalism is only one application of machine-authorship. Similar programs 
are being created in fields as diverse as fractal analysis and music composition. 
As these machine-made programs become a common form of creative 
expression, the law must adapt to new technology if it is to fulfill its 
commitment to advancing the public interest.  
Given the technological nature of the products and the incentive structure 
of the various parties, there are serious questions to consider before affording 
copyright protection to machine-authored works. On the one hand, the 
programmer can already copyright her software. It is not clear that allowing 
her to copyright the output of these programs would further incentivize her 
to write programs without severely handicapping public access. On the other 
hand, the end-user has commercial interests, which, in the digital age, 
incentivize using programs to publish news articles regardless of whether 
these articles are copyrightable. In light of these incentive structures, a strong 
argument can be made that, as a matter of public policy, machine-authored 
works should not be afforded any copyright protection. While these works 
would likely satisfy the established legal requirements of the Copyright Act 
and subsequent interpretations, there remain fundamental questions of 
authorship, allocation, and public benefit. 
This generation of mechanical authors needs no legal motivation to 
generate creative works. Financial motivations and legal reasoning do not 
incentivize the machine author of the future. Although machine authorship 
is protected by existing copyright law, it would occur with or without 
additional legal protection. Regardless of whether or not the law grants 
copyright protection, programs will continue to work away with each passing 
moment, processing, computing, and creating. It would be meaningless and, 
indeed, against public policy to try to fit machine-authored works into current 
copyright law. 
 
 
perma.cc/FJB3-EMRX] (discussing how Disney has lobbied to extend the copyright term every time 
Mickey Mouse was on the verge of entering the public domain). 
